Interdependent value multi-unit auctions for initial allocation of emission permits
作者:Wang, YJ (Wang, Ya-juan)[ 1 ] ; Wang, XJ (Wang, Xian-jia)[ 2 ]
编者:Li, J; Dong, F
SELECTED PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WASTE MANAGEMENT AND TECHNOLOGY
丛书: Procedia Environmental Sciences
卷: 31  页: 812-816
DOI: 10.1016/j.proenv.2016.02.080
出版年: 2016
会议名称
会议: 10th International Conference on Waste Management and Technology (ICWMT)
会议地点: Mianyang, PEOPLES R CHINA
会议日期: OCT 28-30, 2015
会议赞助商:Tsinghua Univ; Solid Waste & Chem Management Ctr; Minist Environm Protect China; SW Univ Sci & Technol; United Nations Environm Programme; Basel Convent Regional Ctr Asia & Pacif, Stockholm Convent Regional Ctr Capac bldg & Transfer Technol in Asia & Pacif
摘要
Auctions have been shown to be able to tackle the efficient allocation of initial emission permits, but most of existing works only consider the problem with private values. They can not deal with the information externalities that each polluter's value depends on his own private information as well as the information of other polluters. In this paper, we model the allocation problem of initial emission permits as a multi-unit auction with interdependent values and propose a mechanism. First, we give the assumptions, i.e., each polluter is allowed to submit a series of marginal value functions which are declining in the number of units allocated, each polluter's signal to marginal values is independent private information and his marginal values are interdependent. Second, we establish a designing model for efficient multi-unit auction mechanism with interdependent values according to above assumptions. Third, we get the auction mechanism by solving this model and give the detail steps to show how to implement the auction mechanism in practice. Finally, we give an application example to show the operability of the auction mechanism proposed by this paper. The conclusion can be drawn that our auction mechanism can prevent polluters from cheating in the auction, achieve the social welfare optimization, and provide the environmental management departments with the theoretical basis and reference methods to realize the fairness and effectiveness of initial allocation of emission permits. (C) 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
关键词
作者关键词:initial allocation of emission permits; multi-unit auction mechanism with interdependent values; fairness; effectiveness
作者信息
通讯作者地址: Wang, YJ (通讯作者)
显示增强组织信息的名称        Wuhan Univ Sci & Technol, School Management, Wuhan 430081, Peoples R China.
地址:
显示增强组织信息的名称        [ 1 ] Wuhan Univ Sci & Technol, School Management, Wuhan 430081, Peoples R China
显示增强组织信息的名称        [ 2 ] Wuhan Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Wuhan 430072, Peoples R China
电子邮件地址:16174208@qq.com
出版商
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV, SARA BURGERHARTSTRAAT 25, PO BOX 211, 1000 AE AMSTERDAM, NETHERLANDS
类别 / 分类
研究方向:Engineering; Environmental Sciences & Ecology
Web of Science 类别:Engineering, Environmental; Environmental Sciences
文献信息
文献类型roceedings Paper
语种:English
入藏号: WOS:000387449800105
ISSN: 1878-0296
其他信息
IDS 号: BG2LR
Web of Science 核心合集中的 "引用的参考文献": 10
Web of Science 核心合集中的 "被引频次": 0，

Interdependent value multi-unit auctions for initial allocation of emission permits
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