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投稿SCI意见是“revise”, 有四个审稿人，不知有没有戏，请各位大侠指教~已有6人参与
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Reviewers' comments: Reviewer #1: This manuscript studies the evolution of collective cooperation among selfish agents playing the prisoner's dilemma game, by considering three types of players, namely, elites, scoundrels, and common people. Simulation results show that cooperation can be promoted by the existence of scoundrels, but will be impeded by the presence of elites. This work is interesting and has the potential of publication. However, a revised version needs to consider the following issues: i) The English presentation is really bad. There are many typos and errors. If possible, please ask for a native English scholar to polish the language. ii) The idea of this work is related to the studies of zealots. It is interesting to test the robustness of your conclusions by assuming that all players have the same payoff matrix represented by that of the common people, while elites and scoundrels will always choose the strategies of cooperation and defection. iii) The motivation of this work should be emphasized in the section 'Introduction'. Why it is needed to consider elites and scoundrels? In the section 'Model', the details of the model should be specified. For example, what is NPD? What is payoff matrix? What is b? Below Eq.(1), 200*200=40,000. The simulation settings are unclear. Which algorithm is used? What is the basic time step or an iteration? iv) Some related literature should be cited: Phys. Rev. E 89 (2014), 052813; Scientific Reports 4 (2014), 4095; Scientific Reports 4 (2014), 3597; Chinese Science Bulletin 59 (2014), 3511-3522; Scientific Reports 3 (2013), 1468; Phys. Rev. E, 88 (2013), 012813; Chaos, Solitons & Fractals 51 (2013), 31-35; Physica A 390 (2011), 1234 Reviewer #2: Different from the traditional research of game theory, the authors propose a model where the agents can be divided into three types: elites, scoundrels and commons. Contract with the expectation, they find that interesting elites plays negative role yet scoundrels promote cooperation. This competition is closely related with the dilemma strength. Moreover, they provide further analysis for their observations. In this work, the authors use framework of evolutionary game to research the herding effect in the emergency case. Based on the assumption of escaping behavior is rational, they divided the whole population into two subpopulations. By means of numerous simulations, they find that large reward for rational agents than emotional ones, herding effect dies out by reasonably using the two escaping exists. In addition, they also further explore the phase transition points. Totally, the idea seems interesting, the numerical results are convincing. However, before the final decision, there still exist some problems, which the authors may wish to consider, and which I list below: 1.) The written language seems feasible, but there are some places that need particular attention. For example, in Abstract, "this study focus on…" should delete 'this study focuses on …''. I do not mention them one by one. Please give particular attention to the language expression. 2.) With respect to figs, there are also some problems. ----For each fog, please use the uniform fashion. Now some figs have two axes, but some other have four. Please use the same number of axes. ----in addition, the direction of ticks in each should be identical. ----Fig.3 should be a square lattice rather than rectangle. 3.) The subject of evolutionary game has received outstanding attention, which the authors rightfully mention in the Introduction. Unfortunately, the referral to related works is incomplete, especially for the recent development. For example, when the authors mention the game on spatial networks, please refer to the recent progress of interdependent network games, Sci. Rep. 3 (2013) 1183; Sci. Rep. 3 (2013) 2470; EPL 97 (2012) 48001 and Phys. Rep. 544 (2014) 1. While the traditional spatial reciprocity, they can refer to Sci. Rep. 2 (2012) 369; Phys. Rev. E 85 (2012) 011149; Phys. Rev. E 82 (2010) 021115; EPL 90 (2010) 20001; Phys. Rev. E 88 (2013) 042145; Sci. Rep. 3 (2013) 3055. Totally, this work does not reach necessary requirements of a research paper. Please first tackle the above mentioned basic questions clearly, then I can give further evaluation. Reviewer #3: In this research paper, Peng divides people into three types of agents - the elites who can be regarded as unconditional cooperators, the scoundrels who are unconditional defectors, as well as the common people whose current game strategies depend on their neighborhoods. Then he/she studies how the elites or the scoundrels influence the cooperation situation of the common people when playing the NPD games in a square lattice. Peng shows that, to some extent, the elites can contribute to the emergence of cooperation among the common people, whereas the scoundrels play a negative role in promoting the fraction of cooperators. So he concludes that people can adapt themselves by cooperating to the harsh environment, but they prefer to defect and exploit others in the easy environment. In my eyes, the topic of how individuals behave or make adjustments according to their local environment deserves to be explored. Although the results in this paper are interesting to some extent, the conclusions are only based on the evidence obtained from Monte Carlo simulations in a 200*200 square lattice. In order to make the conclusions scientifically sound, I suggest that (1) some theoretic analysis should be presented, and (2) more complex topological structures should be considered such as the generated networks and the real-world social networks. Apart from the important previous deficiency, I think the current version of this manuscript isn't good enough to be accepted by Physica A unless the presentation is greatly improved and the following comments are considered. (1) The introduction is too general and too short. Please provide a comprehensive and clear introduction about the previous research work. (2) The Figure 2 is unnecessary and I don't think it is a good illustration of social stratification. (3) It is unnecessary to use Figure 4 to explain the same points presented in Figure 3. Reviewer #4: The author studies the cooperation effect in spatial prisoner's dilemma games in which three kinds of players are considered. They found that people are more prone to cooperate in harsh environment with bad neighbors, and a better environment with good neighbors merely leads to the emergence of lazy players and free riders. Before the manuscript is considered to be published, the following questions must be answered: 1. The style and grammar should be improved as much as possible, and many misprints are found in the manuscript. 2. According to the payoff matrix for players who are elites, cooperation is the predominant and rational strategy, while defection is the rational and predominant strategy for the scoundrels according to their payoff matrix. So can I conclude that there exists no competition between the players when they are elites or scoundrels ? it is no longer a game for these two kinds of players almost, and of course, no longer a prisoner's dilemma game ( see your title). You must explain this in the revised manuscript. 3.The payoff matrixes for elites and scoundrels need to be modified, it is misleading when it is written 1+1 or 0+1. |
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