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[交流] 请帮看下面文章的收录信息是被EI还是SCI检索，谢谢

Revenue-sharing contract to coordinate independent participants within the supply chain

  National Library of China Shanghai Jiaotong University          more options

Author(s): Chen KB (Chen Kebing), Gao CX (Gao Chengxiu), Wang Y (Wang Yan)

Source: JOURNAL OF SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND ELECTRONICS Volume: 18 Issue: 3 Pages: 520-526 Published: SEP 2007
Times Cited: 0    References: 9

Abstract: To improve the performance of the supply chain with one supplier and multiple retailers under deterministic price-sensitive customer demand, an optimal strategy is proposed based on knowledge discovery. First the decentralized system in which the supplier and the retailers are independent, profit-maximizing participants with the supplier acting as a Stackelberg game leader is studied. Numerical examples illustrate the importance of the coordination. The conventional quantity discount mechanism needs to be modified to coordinate the supply chain, so a revenue-sharing contract is proposed to coordinate such supply chain. Lastly, a special decision under certain demand rates is studied. The pricing and replenishment policies can be decided sequentially, which yields much less loss comparing with optimal decision when the demand rates are sufficiently large.

Document Type: Article
Language: English
Author Keywords: supply chain management; coordination mechanism; revenue-sharing contract; Stackelberg game; sequential strategy
KeyWords Plus: REPLENISHMENT STRATEGIES; SYSTEMS
Addresses: Chen, KB (reprint author), Nanjing Univ Aeronaut & Astronaut, Coll Sci, Nanjing 210016, Peoples R China
Nanjing Univ Aeronaut & Astronaut, Coll Sci, Nanjing 210016, Peoples R China
Wuhan Univ, Sch Math & Stat, Wuhan 430072, Peoples R China

Publisher: SYSTEMS ENGINEERING & ELECTRONICS, EDITORIAL DEPT, PO BOX 142-32, BEIJING, 100854, PEOPLES R CHINA

IDS Number: 294KF

ISSN: 1004-4132

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