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One of the principal remedies to agency problems is the law. Corporate and other law gives outside investors, including shareholders, certain powers to protect their investment against expropriation by insiders. These powers in the case of shareholders range from the right to receive the same per share dividends as the insiders, to the right to vote on important corporate matters, including the election of directors, to the right to sue the company for damages. The very fact that this legal protection exists probably explains why becoming a minority shareholder is a viable investment strategy, as opposed to just being an outright giveaway of money to strangers who are under few if any obligations to give it back. As pointed out by La Porta et al. (1998), the extent of legal protection of outside investors differs enormously across countries. Legal protection consists of both the content of the laws and the quality of their enforcement. Some countries, including most notably the wealthy common law countries such as the U.S. and the U.K., provide effective protection of minority shareholders so that the outright expropriation of corporate assets by the insiders is rare. Agency problems manifest themselves primarily through non-value-maximizing investment choices. In many other countries, the condition of outside investors is a good deal more precarious, but even there some protection does exist. La Porta et al. (1998) show in particular that common law countries appear to have the best legal protection of minority shareholders, whereas civil law countries, and most conspicuously the French civil law countries, have the weakest protection. The quality of investor protection, viewed as a proxy for lower agency costs, has been shown to matter for a number of important issues in corporate finance. For example, corporate ownership is more concentrated in countries with inferior shareholder protection (La Porta et al.(1998), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999)). The valuation and breadth of capital markets is greater in countries with better investor protection (La Porta et al. (1997), Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998)). Finally, there is some evidence that good investor protection contributes to the efficiency of resource allocation and to economic growth more generally (Levine and Zervos (1998), Rajan and Zingales (1998)). This paper continues this research by examining the dividend puzzle using shareholder protection as a proxy for agency problems. |
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