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Evolution of cooperation under social norms in non-structured populations |
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微型控制器(杈杈代发): 金币+5, 谢谢告知详细检索信息！ 2013-09-26 08:29:51
微型控制器(杈杈代发): 金币+5, 谢谢告知详细检索信息！ 2013-09-26 08:29:51
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Accession number: 20112414057711 Title: Evolution of cooperation under social norms in non-structured populations Authors: Xiaowei, Qi1 ; Guang, Ren1; Gin, Yue1; Aiping, Zhang1 Author affiliation: 1 Marine Engineering, Dalian Maritime University, 116026 Dalian, China Corresponding author: Xiaowei, Q. (xiaowei0735@163.com) Source title: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) Abbreviated source title: Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. Volume: 6728 LNCS Issue: PART 1 Monograph title: Advances in Swarm Intelligence - Second International Conference, ICSI 2011, Proceedings Issue date: 2011 Publication year: 2011 Pages: 347-354 Language: English ISSN: 03029743 E-ISSN: 16113349 ISBN-13: 9783642215148 Document type: Conference article (CA) Conference name: 2nd International Conference on Swarm Intelligence, ICSI 2011 Conference date: June 12, 2011 - June 15, 2011 Conference location: Chongqing, China Conference code: 85128 Sponsor: Chongqing University; Peking University; Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications; Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University Publisher: Springer Verlag, Tiergartenstrasse 17, Heidelberg, D-69121, Germany Abstract: Indirect reciprocity is a key mechanism for the evolution of human cooperation. There are normally two choices in the standard model of indirect reciprocity which works through reputation. Here we introduced the role of costly punishment into the model. The players could have the third choice besides cooperation and defection. The dynamics of cooperation in indirect reciprocity is analyzed under the social norms which depend on the action of the donor and the reputation of the recipient. It is found that those strategies using costly punishment which allow the evolutionary stability of cooperation typically reduce the average payoff of the population and there is only a small parameter region where costly punishment is evolutionary stable and more efficient. The computer simulations based on agent in finite populations are performed and the result is agreement with our theoretical predictions. © 2011 Springer-Verlag. Number of references: 13 Main heading: Computer simulation Controlled terms: Artificial intelligence - Cellular automata Uncontrolled terms: costly punishment - Evolution of cooperation - Evolutionary stability - Evolutionary stable strategies - Finite population - indirect reciprocity - Parameter regions - Social norm - The standard model - Theoretical prediction Classification code: 723 Computer Software, Data Handling and Applications - 921 Mathematics DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-21515-5_41 Database: Compendex Compilation and indexing terms, © 2013 Elsevier Inc. |
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