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标题：Analysis of the multasking principal-agent model in the housing management |
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恭喜，已经检索了 Accession number: 20104913458830 Title: Analysis of the multasking principal-agent model in the housing management Authors: Zhang, Yufeng1 ; Mao, Jie2 ; Cheng, Hongqun2 Author affiliation: 1 School of Civiland Architectural Engineering, Wuhan University, Wuhan, China 2 School of Economics and Management, Wuhan University, Wuhan, China Corresponding author: Zhang, Y. Source title: Proceedings of the International Conference on E-Business and E-Government, ICEE 2010 Abbreviated source title: Proc. Int. Conf. E-Bus. E-Gov., ICEE Monograph title: Proceedings of the International Conference on E-Business and E-Government, ICEE 2010 Issue date: 2010 Publication year: 2010 Pages: 13-17 Article number: 5591164 Language: English ISBN-13: 9780769539973 Document type: Conference article (CA) Conference name: 1st International Conference on E-Business and E-Government, ICEE 2010 Conference date: May 7, 2010 - May 9, 2010 Conference location: Guangzhou, China Conference code: 82349 Sponsor: South China University of Technology Publisher: IEEE Computer Society, 445 Hoes Lane - P.O.Box 1331, Piscataway, NJ 08855-1331, United States Abstract: There exist three main tasks in housing management including housing and basic equipment maintenance management, environment management and safety management, which form the multitasking principal-agent relation between the owner and the property service enterprise. Based on the overall utility of property service, when the owner delegate property service enterprise with those tasks respectively, the optimal incentive of each task is independent with each other. However, when there is only one enterprise in charge of those tasks, the incentive would change with task costs varying interdependently. The establishment of the model will help the owner to take different incentive measures for different tasks, and realize the "win-win" between the owner and property service enterprise. © 2010 IEEE. |
3楼2010-12-17 19:40:54
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